Page 64 - CMA Journal (Sep-Oct 2025)
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Articles Section



              Raisman Award and Ad Hoc Grants                  President convene the NFC every five years (or earlier) to
                                                               review and recommend new arrangements for
              One of the first attempts to address fiscal disparities was   intergovernmental finance  (Government of Pakistan,
              the Raisman Award of 1947, implemented in 1952. This
                                                               1973, Art. 160). Article 160(2) outlines four specific areas
              award provided a framework for distributing certain
                                                               for NFC recommendations:
              federal tax revenues among the provinces. Its key
              features included:                               1.  Distribution of specified federal taxes between the
               •  Allocation of shares based almost entirely on    federation and provinces.
                 population, favoring Punjab due to its demographic
                 dominance.                                    2.  Grants-in-aid to provincial governments.
               •  Provision of grants-in-aid to smaller provinces such   3.  The exercise of borrowing powers by the federal and
                 as Balochistan to compensate for their weaker fiscal   provincial governments.
                 capacity.
                                                               4.  Any other financial matter referred by the President.
               •  Central government control over major taxes such as
                 customs duties and corporate income tax (World   The explicit inclusion of borrowing in Article 160(2)(c)
                 Bank, 2019).                                  reflects a forward-looking vision of fiscal coordination. It
                                                               acknowledges that debt management is as crucial to
              Despite its significance, the Raisman Award was limited
              in scope, focusing narrowly on tax distribution.   fiscal sustainability as tax allocation (Rana, 2019).
              Borrowing was not considered relevant because:
                                                               Borrowing Provisions in the
               •  The federal government retained exclusive control   Constitution
                 over both domestic and external debt management.
               •  Provinces lacked institutional capacity to manage   In addition to Article 160, other constitutional provisions
                 debt independently.                           detail how borrowing is to be conducted:

               •  The political context of the time emphasized   • Article  166:  Governs federal borrowing, allowing
                 state-building and national security, leaving little   the federal government to raise loans secured by the
                 room for provincial fiscal autonomy (Waseem, 2010).  Federal Consolidated Fund.
              Centralization and Fiscal Dependence               • Article  167: Governs provincial borrowing.
                                                                   Historically, provinces were restricted to domestic
              Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan’s fiscal    borrowing only.
              framework remained highly centralized. Provinces relied
              almost entirely on federal transfers to fund their budgets.   The 18th Constitutional Amendment (2010) introduced
              This dependence created vertical fiscal imbalances,   Article  167(4),  allowing  provinces  to  borrow
              where expenditure responsibilities were devolved to   internationally within limits set by the National Economic
              provinces without corresponding revenue powers
                                                               Council (NEC) or federal law (Government of Pakistan,
              (Ahmed et al., 2020). Borrowing remained a federal   2010, Art. 167(4)). This  architecture  theoretically
              monopoly, with provinces playing a minimal role in debt
                                                               empowers provinces while ensuring coordinated debt
              management. Consequently, subnational borrowing was   management through the NFC. In practice, however,
              never debated as a policy issue. This early pattern of
                                                               borrowing remains governed by separate legal
              centralization set the stage for future tensions over fiscal
              autonomy and resource distribution.              frameworks, with no role played by the NFC.
              Constitutional Embedding of the NFC  Evolution of NFC Awards: Exclusive
              and Borrowing                                    Focus on Revenue

              The adoption of the 1973 Constitution marked a   Since 1973, seven NFC Awards have been announced,
              transformative moment for Pakistan’s fiscal federalism. It   each reflecting the political and economic dynamics of
              was designed to address historical grievances by   its time. While these awards have progressively improved
              providing provinces with greater financial autonomy and   revenue-sharing formulas, they have entirely ignored
              creating mechanisms for equitable sharing of resources.
                                                               borrowing powers, leaving a critical constitutional
              Establishment of the NFC                         mandate unfulfilled (Ahmed & Ahmad, 2016).

              Article 160 of the Constitution formally established the
              National Finance Commission (NFC). It mandates that the

              62    ICMA’s Chartered Management Accountant, Sep-Oct 2025
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