Page 65 - CMA Journal (Sep-Oct 2025)
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Articles Section



              First NFC Award (1974)                           1.  Violation of Constitutional Mandate:
                                                                   •  Article 160 uses the word  “shall”, creating a
              The first NFC Award laid the foundation for Pakistan’s   mandatory obligation for the NFC to address
              modern fiscal framework:
                                                                      borrowing powers (Ahmed & Ahmad, 2016).
               •  Introduced the concept of a divisible pool of federal   •  By ignoring this mandate, successive NFCs have
                 taxes.                                               failed to implement the Constitution fully.
               •  20% retained by the federation, 80% allocated to   2.  Fragmented Debt Governance:
                 provinces, with intra-provincial distribution based   •  Federal borrowing is managed through the Fiscal
                 solely on population (Khan, 2017).                   Responsibility and Debt Limitation (FRDL) Act
                                                                      2005, which sets targets for debt sustainability
              •   Focused exclusively on tax sharing, ignoring        (Ministry of Finance, 2023).
                 borrowing entirely.
                                                                   •  Provincial borrowing remains governed by
              Fourth NFC Award (1990)                                 Article 167, with the federal government
                                                                      retaining veto power over provinces that owe
              The fourth NFC Award expanded the divisible pool and    debts to the center.
              included direct transfers, such as net hydropower profits
              to provinces. It sought to correct fiscal disparities but   3.  Absence of Judicial Oversight:
              continued the pattern of neglecting borrowing powers   •  No judicial challenge has been raised to enforce
              (World Bank, 2019).                                     Article 160(2)(c), reflecting the political sensitivity
                                                                      of debt issues and the reluctance of courts to
              Fifth NFC Award (1997)                                  intervene.

              The fifth NFC Award raised provincial shares to 50% and   In a recent episode of Pakistan’s fiscal governance, it is
              introduced  incentives  for  provincial  revenue  worth pondering that the explicit mention of borrowing
              mobilization  (Rana, 2019). Despite these progressive   in the Terms of Reference (ToRs) of the 10th and 11th
              reforms, no mechanism was introduced for managing   National Finance Commissions (NFCs) represents a
              provincial borrowing.                            significant acknowledgement of the constitutional

                                                               mandate enshrined in Article 160 of the 1973
              Seventh NFC Award (2010) and the
                                                               Constitution of Pakistan. Article 160 clearly stipulates
              18th Amendment                                   that the NFC is responsible for making recommendations
              The 7th NFC Award represented a landmark in Pakistan’s   not only on the distribution of federal taxes and
              fiscal history:                                  grants-in-aid but also on the exercise of borrowing
                                                               powers by both federal and provincial governments.
               •  Increased provincial shares to 56% in 2010-11, rising   Historically, earlier NFC Awards particularly the landmark
                 to 57.5% thereafter.                          7th NFC Award of 2010 completely overlooked
               •  Introduced a multi-factor formula for intra-provincial   borrowing, focusing exclusively on revenue-sharing
                 distribution:                                 mechanisms. The inclusion of borrowing in the ToRs of
                                                               subsequent NFCs was, therefore, a positive and
                 1.  Population – 82%                          much-needed development, reflecting a recognition
                 2.  Poverty/backwardness – 10.3%
                 3.  Revenue effort – 5%                       that coordinated borrowing is integral to achieving fiscal
                                                               federalism and macroeconomic stability.
                 4.  Inverse population density – 2.7%
                                                               However, this inclusion has largely remained symbolic
              Simultaneously, the 18th Amendment devolved      rather than substantive. The 10th NFC   failed to produce
                                                                                               1
              significant powers to provinces and allowed them to   any concrete recommendations, leaving the matter
              borrow internationally. However, no framework for   unresolved, while the deliberations of the 11th NFC are
              borrowing coordination was embedded in the NFC   still ongoing. From a legal and constitutional standpoint,
              Award, resulting in a disconnect between revenue   the explicit reference to borrowing in the ToRs reinforces
              allocation and debt responsibilities.
                                                               that this matter is not discretionary, but rather a
              Legal and Fiscal Implications of                 constitutional obligation of the NFC. Failure to address
                                                               borrowing through a coherent framework represents a
              Excluding Borrowing                              breach of the constitutional intent behind Article 160.
                                                               The Constitution envisioned the NFC as a collaborative
              Legal Implications
                                                               mechanism for federal-provincial financial coordination,
              The omission of borrowing from NFC deliberations has   ensuring that both tiers of government act within a
              profound legal consequences:                     unified fiscal strategy.


               1   The 8 th , 9 th , and 10 th  NFCs all remained inconclusive and did not result in a finalized award.
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